CO129-404 - Acting Governor Claud Severn - 1913 [10-12] — Page 30

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od qu devond read avad anoidaireя anitzareno e

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to auistaqqs norvald e agenɑog for ob tremurzovoð Bif" .S

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inoitaja onitxaraup a to trouglupe azit ni bahulazi

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Dit vraqmogos ɔt od blirɔw 21 yðøb saori arujosgnal owt 1ɔ framt

e "nitooyant at reoitto test nerw trol ons to trpitto {[æsH

moltaborronos zozɔ bas rozkonɛaq onlź tant een ɔf Tebro HÌ - tie

eng bisad no abrať [la dart boa noitiónos rojostalima a ni oza

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I ‚ÍTO¶ sáð to “roltto ddie." ant yd moltɔegent not borstaina ovяa blow ti bra (atroq teɔa ni orob al aidt tædt bastarobrus .:oldusqani yot anoffibros eft avovynik ham omit Kaum

nl com*ch vistimen to ont c% to autolémnenja oglan .+

XOX ir led de voltata enitrenRIG SZOBAT artm Hoo &0rro

-

is not well situated nor is it edequately equipped for dealing

with the passengers of a ship infected with yellow fever. It is

on the mainland and within a mile of a considerable population

and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to isolate

patients who were suffering from an infectious disease which is

conveyed by insects. Even for the general purposes of a quaran-

tine station it is not a desirable one, e.g. for arresting the

spread of cholera. As to the probability of an isolation stat-

ion being an imperious demand in the near future the following

argument may be advanced:- That the measures to be taken by the

port authorities of the yellow fever zone in Central America

will reduce to a minimum the risk of the diɛcase being conveyed

on board a ship; that a second line of defence has to be broken

through by such a ship at her subsequent ports of call; and that

the length of the voyage and the latitudes traversed will fur-

ther obviate the risk. The first end second of those statements

may be correct in the great majority of instances, but they do

not altogether exclude the possibilities in the case, for yellow

fever may appear days or weeks after a ship has sailsd, an

occurrence which is by no means unknown in the history of this

disease; and, as to the third statment it is known that the

stegomyia fasciata can survive the passage of latitudes outside

the tropics. Many authorities, including Sir Patrick Manson

allege that yellow fever will undoubtedly spread to Asia after

the opening of the Panama Canal, unless stringent preventive

measures be adopted.

5. Although all needful caution must beexercised before recommending action to be taken which will involve a consider- able outlay in establishing and maintaining a station properly equipped and with a sufficient staff, on the other hand it would be almost impossible to meet the call for such a place by the methods of emergency, while the lengthy warning es to the need for being ready for such an emergency together with the impor- tance of the results of a state of unpreparedness causes me to

advise

at

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